“This article first appeared in the June 2024 issue of the Hong Kong Lawyer, the official journal of The Law Society of Hong Kong.”

仲裁庭關(guān)于違法行為的裁決是否與公共政策相沖突？

在任何司法管轄區(qū)，經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的仲裁員和仲裁從業(yè)者都需要注意對(duì)裁決提出質(zhì)疑程序的復(fù)雜性。 在原訟法庭最近作出的一項(xiàng)判決中，G -v- N案揭示了以公共政策理由對(duì)仲裁庭有關(guān)違法行為免責(zé)辯護(hù)的裁決提出質(zhì)疑的細(xì)微差別。

香港原訟法庭最近在G -v- N [2023] HKCFI 3366案中作出的判決是原訟法庭以公共政策為理由下令發(fā)還重審的最新案例之一。 該判決為仲裁庭有關(guān)違法行為免責(zé)辯護(hù)的裁決是否及在何種程度上受香港法院審查提供了有用的指引，該裁決本質(zhì)上涉及公共政策的考慮。

根據(jù)香港《仲裁條例》（第609章），除非有關(guān)仲裁協(xié)議明文規(guī)定《仲裁條例》附表2第5至7條的條文適用，否則不得就法律問題對(duì)仲裁裁決提出上訴。

然而，根據(jù)《仲裁條例》第81條（《貿(mào)法委示范法》第34條），香港高等法院可基于某些有限的特定理由撤銷仲裁裁決，包括裁決與公共政策相抵觸。 香港法院亦有權(quán)將整項(xiàng)裁決或裁決的某部分發(fā)還給仲裁庭重新考慮，或采取仲裁庭認(rèn)為將糾正撤銷決定的理由的任何行動(dòng)。

與一貫支持仲裁的做法一致，香港法院先前選擇發(fā)還而不是撤銷有缺陷的仲裁裁決，讓仲裁庭有機(jī)會(huì)糾正裁決中的任何錯(cuò)誤或缺陷。

案件背景

該案涉及兩家公司實(shí)體G和N，它們均在英屬維京群島（BVI）注冊(cè)成立。G為K的間接全資附屬公司; K透過G持有N的股份，為N第一大股東; N的其余股份由IZ和其他股東持有。

IZ在N其他股東的支持下，召開股東大會(huì)，以變更N的管理層。 為了使K獲得必要的票數(shù)以否決股東大會(huì)的要求，N（當(dāng)時(shí)由K實(shí)際控制）與G公司簽訂了一份證券購買協(xié)議，以146,868,653美元的價(jià)格（對(duì)價(jià)款）向G配發(fā)16,051,219股額外股份（配股）。

證券購買協(xié)議受香港法律管轄，并包含香港仲裁條款。

BVI訴訟程序

IZ將此事告至BVI法院，以撤銷配股。Jack J. 法官于2021年3月3日作出判決，BVI法院撤銷了該配股，理由是該配股違反了BVI《商業(yè)公司法》第121條。 根據(jù)BVI法院的命令，N召開了一次特別股東大會(huì)，導(dǎo)致N的管理層發(fā)生變化。

裁決

BVI的判決下達(dá)后，G在香港對(duì)N公司提起仲裁，要求歸還先前根據(jù)證券購買協(xié)議支付的對(duì)價(jià)款，對(duì)N提出不當(dāng)?shù)美蛲耆粚?duì)價(jià)的個(gè)人申索，以及基于根本錯(cuò)誤產(chǎn)生的推定信托的所有權(quán)申索。N回應(yīng)稱，不應(yīng)容許G收回對(duì)價(jià)款，因?yàn)榕涔捎羞`法之處，即BVI法院在IZ提起的訴訟中認(rèn)定違反第121條的行為。

香港仲裁庭在其第一份部分裁決中認(rèn)定，配股是非法的，并以違法行為免責(zé)辯護(hù)適用為由，駁回了G的申索要求。在此過程中，仲裁庭采用了Tinsley -v- Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340案中確立的有關(guān)違法行為的「依賴方法」。該案認(rèn)為，如果一個(gè)人必須直接依賴違法行為才能勝訴，那么他一般不應(yīng)獲得補(bǔ)救。然而，就在裁決前幾天，香港上訴法庭在Monat Investment Ltd -v- All Person（s） In Occupation of Part of The Remaining Portion of Lot No 591 in Mui Wo DD 4 No 16 Ma Po Tsuen， Mui Wo， Lantau Island [2023] HKCA 479案中決定， 英國最高法院在Patel -v- Mirza [2017] AC 467案中確立的「一系列因素方法」代表香港關(guān)于違法行為的法律，而不是Tinsley案中的「依賴方法」（已在香港適用）。

原訟法庭的判決

法官陳美蘭認(rèn)為，法庭有權(quán)復(fù)審仲裁庭有關(guān)公共政策的決定，如果法庭認(rèn)為該裁決違反香港的公共政策，則可撤銷該裁決。

在這方面，陳美蘭法官承認(rèn)有理由反對(duì)撤銷該裁決。具體而言，根據(jù)《紐約公約》和《示范法》維持裁決的終局性非常重要。此外，樞密院先前在Betamax-v-State Trading Corp[2021] UKPC 14案中認(rèn)為，該案下級(jí)法院在審查該案的仲裁員關(guān)于違法行為的決定時(shí)存在錯(cuò)誤。此外，即使仲裁庭誤解了相關(guān)的公共政策，這充其量也只是法律錯(cuò)誤，超出了法庭的審查范圍。

盡管如此，經(jīng)過仔細(xì)考慮案件事實(shí)后，法官認(rèn)為她有權(quán)對(duì)該裁決進(jìn)行復(fù)審。

裁決為何被復(fù)審？

法庭有權(quán)復(fù)審該裁決，因?yàn)榉ㄍビ袡?quán)力和責(zé)任考慮該裁決是否違反香港現(xiàn)行的公共政策。此外，復(fù)審亦澄清了仲裁庭對(duì)公共政策的考慮是否符合Patel案中的指導(dǎo)原則，該指導(dǎo)原則已得到上訴法庭認(rèn)可，適用于香港。

違法問題的判定可以分為兩個(gè)不同的階段。第一階段涉及仲裁庭為了查明任何不合法性而對(duì)事實(shí)和法律進(jìn)行調(diào)查的結(jié)果。第二階段涉及監(jiān)督法院或上級(jí)法庭對(duì)仲裁庭裁定的任何違法行為的影響進(jìn)行確定。在對(duì)Betamax進(jìn)行適當(dāng)分析后，樞密院僅認(rèn)為香港法院不能復(fù)審仲裁庭有關(guān)第一階段的決定。然而，在第二階段，如果仲裁庭認(rèn)定存在某些違法行為，香港法院仍然可以確定該違法行為（仲裁庭所認(rèn)定）是否會(huì)導(dǎo)致在香港執(zhí)行裁決會(huì)違反公共政策。香港法院的這項(xiàng)分析不會(huì)影響或削弱裁決的最終性，因?yàn)橄愀鄯ㄔ翰粫?huì)復(fù)審或推翻仲裁庭的任何法律或事實(shí)裁決，這些裁決仍然是最終并具有約束力的。

在本案中，G并沒有質(zhì)疑仲裁庭對(duì)事實(shí)和法律的認(rèn)定，包括違反第121條的認(rèn)定。相反，G爭(zhēng)辯，根據(jù)Patel案的「一系列因素方法」，仲裁庭以上述理由拒絕給予G濟(jì)助的決定是完全不相稱的，會(huì)產(chǎn)生裁決違反公共政策的不公正結(jié)果。因此，這是法院可以而且應(yīng)該考慮和決定的問題。

最終，法官?zèng)]有決定該裁決是否與香港的公共政策相沖突。相反，法官認(rèn)為，根據(jù)案件的事實(shí)，更合適的做法是暫停撤銷程序，并將此事發(fā)還仲裁員，讓仲裁庭有機(jī)會(huì)根據(jù)Patel案的做法重新考慮其決定，并采取仲裁庭認(rèn)為可消除撤銷理由的行動(dòng)。

關(guān)鍵要點(diǎn)

違法問題的判定可以分為兩個(gè)不同的階段。第一階段涉及仲裁庭為了查明任何不合法性而對(duì)事實(shí)和法律進(jìn)行調(diào)查的結(jié)果。第一階段顯然屬于仲裁庭的實(shí)質(zhì)權(quán)限，法院不能對(duì)其進(jìn)行審查。

在第二階段，監(jiān)督法院評(píng)估仲裁庭認(rèn)定的任何違法行為的影響。法院隨后決定仲裁庭在這方面的裁決是否與香港的公共政策相沖突。該評(píng)估是使用Patel案例的「一系列因素方法」進(jìn)行。雖然該裁決的重點(diǎn)是試圖根據(jù)《仲裁條例》第81條（也稱為《示范法》第34條）宣布仲裁裁決無效，但陳美蘭法官的判決暗示，對(duì)執(zhí)行仲裁裁決的質(zhì)疑也可以采用類似的方法。正如《仲裁條例》第86（2）（b）條和第89（3）（b）條所述，可以裁決違反公共政策為由提出異議。

盡管如此，值得注意的是，按照法庭一貫支持仲裁的立場(chǎng)，即使G -v-N案中仲裁庭未能采用Patel測(cè)試，原訟法庭還是選擇將裁決發(fā)還仲裁庭重審，而非直接判定裁決違反公共政策。

因此，實(shí)際上，香港法院可能不太傾向推翻仲裁庭所作的決定，因?yàn)橹俨猛ピ谶`法行為問題上采用了正確的Patel檢驗(yàn)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。這個(gè)問題需要香港法院今后在遇到適當(dāng)?shù)陌讣r(shí)作出裁決加以澄清。

Is an Arbitration Tribunal's Decision on Illegality in Conflict With Public Policy?

Experienced arbitrators and arbitration practitioners, based in any jurisdiction, need to be mindful of the intricacies of the processes for challenging an Award. In a recent decision by the Court of First Instance (CFI), the case of G -v- N sheds light on the nuanced challenge based on public policy grounds against an arbitral tribunal’s decision concerning an illegality defence.

The recent decision of the Court of First Instance of Hong Kong (“CFI”) in G -v- N [2023] HKCFI 3366 is one of the latest instances where a remission was ordered by the CFI, in the context of a public policy challenge. This decision provides useful guidance on whether and to what extent, a tribunal’s decision on an illegality defence which by its nature involves consideration of public policy, is subject to the Hong Kong Court’s curial review.

Under the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609) of Hong Kong (“AO”), unless the relevant arbitration agreement expressly provides for application of the opt-in provisions in sections 5-7 of Schedule 2 of the AO, an arbitral award cannot be appealed on a question of law.

However, under section 81 of the AO (Article 34 of the Model Law), an arbitral award may be set aside by the Hong Kong High Court on certain limited specified grounds. This includes where the award conflicts with the public policy of Hong Kong. It also provides the Hong Kong Court with the power to remit the matter back to the arbitral tribunal for reconsideration, or to take any action that the tribunal believes will rectify the reasons for setting aside the decision.

Consistent with its usual pro-arbitration approach, the Hong Kong Court has previously opted to remit, rather than set aside, defective arbitral awards. This allows the tribunal an opportunity to correct any errors or deficiencies in the awards.

Context of the Case

The case involves two corporate entities, G and N, both incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (BVI). G is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of K; K held the shares in N through G and was N’s largest shareholder; and the rest of the shares of N were held by IZ and other shareholders.

IZ, with the support of other shareholders of N, called a shareholders’ meeting for the purpose of changing the management of N. For the purpose of giving K the necessary votes to defeat the requisition for the shareholders’ meeting, N (which was then under the de facto control of K) entered into a Securities Purchase Agreement (“SPA”) with G for the allotment of 16,051,219 extra shares to G (“Allotment”) in exchange for the price of US $146,868,653 (“Consideration Monies”).

The SPA was governed by Hong Kong Law and contained a Hong Kong arbitration clause.

The BVI Proceedings

IZ took the matter to court in the BVI to set aside the Allotment. In a ruling by Judge Jack J. on March 3, 2021, the BVI Court set aside the Allotment on the ground that the Allotment violated Section 121 of the BVI Business Companies Act. Pursuant to an order of the BVI Court, a special shareholder meeting of N’ was called, leading to a change in N’s management.

The Award

After the judgment in the BVI was handed down, G commenced arbitration in Hong Kong against N, seeking restitution of the Consideration Monies previously paid under the SPA for a personal claim against N for unjust enrichment or total failure of consideration, as well as a proprietary claim based on a constructive trust arising out of fundamental mistake. In response, N claimed that G should not be permitted to recover the Consideration Monies because the Allotment was tainted by illegality, namely the breach of Section 121 identified by the BVI Court in the proceedings commenced by IZ.

By its 1st Partial Award, the Hong Kong seated arbitral tribunal held that the Allotment was illegal and dismissed G’s claims on the basis that the illegality defence applied. In doing so, the Tribunal applied the “reliance approach” regarding illegality established in Tinsley -v- Milligan [1994] 1 AC 340. This case held that a person should not generally be granted a remedy where he has to rely directly on unlawful conduct to succeed. However, just a few days before the Award, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal held in Monat Investment Ltd -v- All Person(s) In Occupation of Part of The Remaining Portion of Lot No 591 in Mui Wo DD 4 No 16 Ma Po Tsuen, Mui Wo, Lantau Island [2023] HKCA 479 that the “range of factors approach” established by the UK Supreme Court in Patel -v- Mirza [2017] AC 467, rather than the “reliance approach” in Tinsley (which had been applied in Hong Kong), represented Hong Kong law on illegality.

G then applied to the High Court of Hong Kong to set aside the Award on the ground that, amongst other things, the Award was in conflict with the public policy of Hong Kong on illegality.

Decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI)

Mimmie Chan J. held that the Court was entitled to review the Tribunal’s decision regarding public policy and, if the Court considered the Award to be contrary to the public policy of Hong Kong, to set aside the Award.

In this regard, Mimmie Chan J. accepted that there were sound arguments against setting aside the Award. Specifically that it was important to maintain the finality of awards under the New York Convention and the Model Law. Also, it was previously held by the Privy Council in Betamax -v- State Trading Corp [2021] UKPC 14 that the Court below in that case was in error in reviewing the decision of the arbitrator in that case on illegality. Furthermore, even if the Tribunal had misunderstood what the relevant public policy was, this was at best an error in law, which is outside the scope of the Court’s curial review.

Nevertheless, after careful consideration on the facts of the case, the learned judge held that she was entitled to review the Award.

Why was the Award Reviewed?

The Court was entitled to review the Award because it was in its power and duty to consider whether the Award was contrary to the current public policy of Hong Kong. Also, the review clarified whether the Tribunal’s consideration of public policy complied with the guidelines in Patel, as now recognized by the Court of Appeal as applicable in Hong Kong.

The determination of the question of illegality can be divided into two distinct stages. Stage one involves the arbitral tribunal’s findings of fact and law for the purpose of ascertaining any unlawfulness. Stage two involves the determination by the supervisory, or curial, Court of the effect of any illegality found by the tribunal. On a proper analysis of Betamax, the Privy Council only held that the Hong Kong Court cannot review the tribunal’s decision regarding stage one. However, at stage two, in cases where some illegality is identified by the tribunal, it remains open for a Hong Kong Court to determine whether the effect of the illegality (as found by the tribunal) is to render enforcement in Hong Kong contrary to public policy. This analysis by the Hong Kong Court does not affect or undermine the finality of the award because the Hong Kong Court is not reviewing or overturning any findings of law or fact of the tribunal, which remain final and binding.

In the present case, G did not challenge the Tribunal’s findings of fact and law, including the finding that there was a breach of Section 121. Rather, G only sought to argue that the Tribunal’s decision to deny relief to G on the basis of said breach was wholly disproportionate and would produce an unjust result that the Award would be contrary to public policy in accordance with the “range of factors approach” in Patel. Thus, this was a question that the Court could, and should, consider and decide.

Ultimately, the learned judge did not proceed with deciding whether the Award was in conflict with the public policy of Hong Kong. Rather, Her Ladyship considered that, on the facts of the case, the more appropriate action was to suspend the set aside proceedings and remit the matter back to the arbitrator. This would give the Tribunal an opportunity to re-consider its decision in the light of the approach in Patel and to take such action, as in the Tribunal’s opinion would eliminate the ground for setting aside.

Key Takeaways

The determination of the question of illegality can be divided into two distinct stages. Stage one involves the arbitral tribunal’s findings of fact and law for the purpose of ascertaining any unlawfulness. Stage one is clearly within the substantive purview of the tribunal and cannot be reviewed by the Court.

In the second stage, the supervisory court assesses the impact of any illegality identified by the tribunal. The court then decides if the tribunal’s decision in this regard is in conflict with Hong Kong’s public policy. The assessment is made using the “range of factors approach” outlined in the Patel case.

While the ruling focused on an attempt to invalidate an arbitral award under section 81 of the Arbitration Ordinance (AO) – also known as Article 34 of the Model Law – Mimmie Chan J.’s judgment hints that a similar approach may be taken for challenges against enforcing arbitral awards. Such challenges could be based on the grounds that the award violated public policy, as outlined in sections 86(2)(b), 89(3)(b) of the AO.

Nonetheless, it is worth noting that, in line with its usual pro-arbitration stance, even though the Tribunal in G -v- N failed to apply the Patel test, the CFI chose to remit the Award back to the Tribunal for re-consideration, as opposed to directly deciding the public policy challenge of the Award.

Therefore, it may be that practically, the Hong Kong Court will not be inclined to overturn the decision of an arbitral tribunal that has applied the correct Patel test on illegality. This is an issue that needs to be clarified by future decisions of the Hong Kong Court when a suitable case come along.